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Abstract
This paper explores the capability of the state to aﬀect the individual’s deci-
sion to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from
the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political vari-
ables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for
crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expendi-
ture decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (ﬁscal crowding
out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government
also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowd-
ing out). And ﬁnally, the more a government supports democratization, the
lower is the individual’s engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity
and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals’ will-
ingness to volunteer.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H41, H44, H31, J22, I38, H11, D30, D64.
Keywords: Volunteering, voluntary labor supply, private provision of public
goods, public social expenditure, political consensus, democratization.
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Volunteering is a widespread economic phenomenon with high relevance for society.
Organizations that beneﬁt from this manpower oﬀer social and health services, ed-
ucation and youth work, rescue, culture, recreation, and religious services, among
other things. From society’s point of view, volunteering is a highly desirable leisure
activity, and volunteers contribute signiﬁcantly to the economic welfare that would
otherwise require paid resources.1 As an example, in 2006 87% of US ﬁre departments
were predominantly operated by volunteers and protected 38% of the population. In
Austria only the six biggest cities have a professional ﬁre brigade. As a consequence,
voluntary ﬁreﬁghters serve at least 70% of the Austrian population; their respon-
sibilities include putting out hazardous ﬁres, rescuing people from car accidents,
and providing other technical rescue services. The German Red Cross covers 40%
of emergency treatment, 60% of patient transport, and 70% of medical assistance
services in Germany, and volunteers make up 80% of its paramedics.2
The share of the population oﬀering voluntary labor varies considerably from country
to country (see column 1 of Table1). Sweden exhibits the highest participation rate
among OECD member countries with a share of 56% of all adults who supply volun-
tary labor, followed by the Slovak Republic (54%), USA (50%), Canada (48%), and
the Netherlands (44%). The group of countries with the lowest participation rates
with values between 14% and 16% consists of Poland, Japan, Spain and Hungary.
In order to explain the motivation to volunteer, the economic literature has fo-
cused on determinants on an individual level. There are three basic explanations
for volunteering: Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) suggest in their seminal paper that
volunteering can either be treated as an ordinary consumption good (consumption
hypothesis) or as a way of increasing an individual’s income on the paid labor market
over time (investment hypothesis). Freeman (1997) argues that organizations look-
ing for productive volunteers address people with high human capital. This strategy
is successful since volunteering is something that people feel morally obligated to
do when asked (conscience good hypothesis). Empirical papers (see Hackl, Halla
and Pruckner, 2007, and references therein) analyzing these three motives identify
a robust relationship between certain economic and socio-demographic characteris-
tics and voluntary engagement. The typical volunteer is employed, highly educated,
married with children and has a high household income.3 This evidence suggests
that people with high opportunity costs of time are those who are willing to work
1Voluntary labor output is not considered in the System of National Accounts. For valuation
techniques of voluntary labor output, see Pho (2008).
2Sources: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov, http://www.feuerwehr.at, and http://www.drk.de.
3Moreover, Meier and Stutzer (2008) provide convincing evidence that volunteers are more sat-
isﬁed with their life than non-volunteers.
2for free.
However, the large variation in participation rates across countries can only be partly
explained by variation in the individual characteristics of the population. Although
working for free is an individual decision, we argue in this paper that citizens from
diﬀerent countries face diﬀerent environments, so participation in volunteer activ-
ities may also depend on living conditions, the cultural environment, institutional
arrangements, (economic) policy measures and the ‘state of society’ in general.
Figure1 shows that even after controlling for a comprehensive set of individual char-
acteristics, a large variation in participation rates in volunteering among countries
remains. This graph is based on a logit estimation of the participation in volunteering
based on almost 38;000 respondents from the European and World Values Survey,
with age, sex, family status, number of children, household income, education, size
of place of residence, and labor market status as explanatory variables. The dots
represent the distribution of individuals’ propensity to volunteer, the diamonds show
the country-speciﬁc predicted means of these distributions, and the x-symbols indi-
cate the corresponding 25% and 75% conﬁdence intervals. Predicted participation
rates can directly be compared with countries’ actual participation rates represented
by triangles. This comparison shows that individual-level variables can only partly
explain the pattern of volunteer behavior. The unexplained remainder is substantial
– the actual participation rate does not lie within the 25 and 75 conﬁdence interval
of predicted values in more than half of all countries. For instance, the predicted
participation rate for the United States based on individual characteristics is 32:8%
whereas the actual participation rate runs up to 50%. Similarly large diﬀerences
can be observed for Canada, Greece, the Slovak Republic or Sweden where actual
rates are underestimated. For countries such as Hungary, Japan, Poland, Portugal
or Spain, the actual participation rates are clearly overestimated.
These results indicate that the analysis of the motivation to volunteer has to be
extended to a wider context including the social, economic and political environment
in which individuals live. In this paper we focus on the role of the state and examine
its potential to inﬂuence the individual’s decision to volunteer. Why should the
state be interested in volunteering activities? Firstly, collective action can serve
as a substitute for the state (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, p. 1648). When
tax revenues and/or the organizational capacity of a state to provide a public good
are limited, voluntary participation by people may be essential. Similarly, it might
be cheaper for the state to advance structures on a macro and micro level for the
promotion of voluntary work than to purchase these activities on the markets (cost
eﬃciency argument). Moreover, it is often argued that the services and functions
provided by volunteers represent goods with merit characteristics. As a consequence,
3volunteering is appreciated as a worthwhile activity per se. And ﬁnally, volunteering
obviously contributes to a society’s social capital that is seen as a prerequisite for
economic growth and well-being.4
Controlling for potential endogeneity with an instrumental variable approach, we
examine crowding in/out of volunteering by governmental activities through three
diﬀerent channels: (i)Allocation and distribution: public social expenditure is hy-
pothesized to crowd in/out volunteer activities (ﬁscal crowding in/out). (ii)Political
consensus: we hypothesize that the individuals’ correspondence with the ideological
orientation of the government may inﬂuence the willingness to volunteer (consen-
sual crowding in/out). (iii)Degree of democratization: ﬁnally, we consider an eﬀect
of the degree of political rights and the possibilities of active participation on the
individual’s propensity to volunteer (participatory crowding in/out).
The paper is structured as follows: the next section summarizes the literature on the
crowding eﬀects of governmental actions and derives testable hypotheses to explore
the role of the state. In Section3, we present the data and our estimation strategy.
Section4 provides the results of our estimations. Potential policy implications are
discussed in the concluding Section5.
2 Crowding eﬀects of governmental action
The variety of services provided by volunteers (social and health services, education,
youth work, family support, rescue activities, culture, recreation, religious services,
and others) makes an unambiguous economic classiﬁcation of these goods impossible.
Some of them are clearly private, some represent public goods or club goods with
collective characteristics and others share characteristics of mixed goods. In general,
these goods and services can either be provided by the state through public (social)
expenditure, via private markets or by residents’ voluntary activities. Even though
a clear-cut categorization of voluntary services is diﬃcult, the majority of services
exhibit public good characteristics. We therefore interpret volunteering as the private
contribution to the public good. Since volunteering exhibits similarities with private
monetary contributions to public goods, the debate about volunteering can refer to
a huge body of public economics literature.
4For a comprehensive discussion and critical acclaim, see e.g. Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti
(1993); Knack and Keefer (1997); Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005).
42.1 Fiscal crowding in/out of money donations
We focus on crowding out eﬀects of volunteering (=private provision of time). The
literature on private money donations to a public good is therefore a natural start-
ing point. In their seminal paper, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provide a
model in which individuals are concerned about their consumption of a private good
and the total provision of a public good. Based on Nash equilibria they show the
extent to which the government provision of a public good may crowd out private
voluntary contribution. Since government-provided quantities of the public good are
paid for with tax revenues in this model, it is crucial whether the taxes are borne in
the group of private contributors and/or among non-contributing consumers. The
authors argue that whenever the set of contributing consumers is only a subset of
the taxpaying population, partial crowding out eﬀects of government provision will
result. Andreoni (1990) extends the analysis by explicitly assuming impure altru-
ism (warm glow) where both the public good and the individual contribution to it
are arguments in an individual’s utility function. This author conﬁrms the ﬁnding
that there is a partial crowding out eﬀect of governmental public goods provision on
private contributions.
Based on these theoretical models, there is a list of papers analyzing the eﬀects of
public expenditure on private money donations empirically: discussing the pre-1991
literature Steinberg (1991) summarizes that relatively small crowding out eﬀects are
observable for private donations. Abrams and Schmitz (1978, 1984), Kingma (1989),
Payne (1998), Chan, Godby, Mestelman and Muller (2002), Ribar and Wilhelm
(2002), and Crumpler and Grossman (2008) provide empirical and experimental evi-
dence for partial crowding out and emphasize the importance of the warm glow eﬀect.
Roberts (1984) presents evidence for a ‘dollar for dollar’ crowding-out phenomenon.
Only Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) do not ﬁnd evidence of crowding out of
private money donations by governmental expenditure.
There is also empirical evidence of crowding in of governmental actions on money
donations: controlling for potential endogeneity of government grants, Khanna and
Sandler (2000) ﬁnd crowding in eﬀects for the United Kingdom. Borgonovi (2006)
reports evidence of an inverted U-shape of the crowding out eﬀect. At least for low
levels of public support, a crowding in eﬀect of private donations can be observed,
whereas at higher levels public expenditure displaces private donations. Summariz-
ing the literature on charitable money giving, there is more evidence of the partial
crowding out hypothesis, although the picture is not clear-cut and requires further
research.
52.2 Fiscal crowding in/out of time donations
It is a priori not clear whether the results on ﬁnancial donations can be transferred
directly to voluntary labor supply (charitable time giving). There are good reasons
to presume considerably lower crowding out or even crowding in compared to the
results on money donations: the direct involvement of the donor in the volunteering
process might increase the warm glow eﬀect compared to more impersonal money
donations. Furthermore, people are willing to donate their time, but not before the
necessary (capital-intensive) infrastructure (e.g. expensive ﬁre engines, ambulances)
is provided by the government. Personal income restrictions might prohibit the
private provision of an adequate infrastructure. From a psychological perspective,
one can argue that the governmental provision of infrastructure is an important
signal for the acknowledgment and the importance of certain volunteering activities.
Only a few (empirical) papers address the relationship between government spend-
ing and volunteering.5 Duncan (1999) extends the theoretical analysis of crowding
out to a public good model where individuals contribute both money and time (vol-
unteering) and does not ﬁnd empirical support for the crowding out hypothesis in
the National Study of Philanthropy from 1974. Simmons and Emanuele (2004) ﬁnd
small crowding out for the US and justify the minor eﬀect with the argument that
governmental expenditure emphasizes the ideals of volunteering and makes volun-
teering more attractive. Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) explore the crowding out
hypothesis with data from the third wave of the European Values Survey for 23 Eu-
ropean countries. They do not ﬁnd evidence to support the crowding out hypothesis
of public expenditure on social capital that includes volunteering. Information on
volunteering behavior is based on the same survey question that we use in our study.
However, the authors employ the rather unspeciﬁc variable of ‘annual total public
expenditure as a percentage of GDP’ as the explaining variable to identify crowd-
ing out. Day and Devlin (1996) ﬁnd, for Canada, a positive impact of government
expenditure on the decision to volunteer but not on the number of hours donated.
Summarizing theoretical and empirical evidence, it remains open whether total pub-
lic expenditure crowds out or crowds in voluntary activities. Even though the eﬀect
of total expenditure aggregates on volunteering is interesting per se, our analysis
with public social expenditure is more revealing due to the correspondence of so-
cial expenditure and the ﬁelds of volunteering activities. Both complementary and
5A related topic is the impact of tax deductions on private money or time donations: Feldman
(2008) analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent tax treatments of monetary donations on the decision to
donate money and time to volunteering institutions. It is shown that more favorable tax deductions
will not only lead to an expected increase in money donations but also increase time donations:
the negative direct substitution eﬀect on the voluntary labor supply is overcompensated since those
who donate more money are more likely to be asked to volunteer.
6substitutive relationships between volunteering and diﬀerent types of expenditure
categories can be expected. The knowledge of this relationship is crucial for the
public sector in its endeavor to promote volunteering activities.
2.3 Consensual crowding in/out of time donations
Focusing on the crowding out eﬀect of the amount of money spent by the government
is too narrow-minded a strategy. It is not only the amount of money that matters;
the question is also for what purpose the money is spent. In that respect, concur-
ring political ideologies of individuals with the ruling decision makers may also be
decisive, and the individuals’ correspondence with the ideological orientation of the
government can be expected to inﬂuence the willingness to volunteer.
In ‘Democracy in America’, de Tocqueville (1835) argued back in the 19th century
that ‘political association singularly strengthens and improves commitment for civil
purposes’. Referring to the example that the state sets by its actions, de Tocqueville
presumed a crowding in eﬀect of political consensus on volunteering. However, this
is not the only plausible hypothesis; a crowding out eﬀect can be expected as well
if the ideology of the ruling powers is used as a predictor for future governmental
action. People may tend to reduce their collective eﬀorts if they think that the
state will behave according to their political preferences. If the political positions
of individuals and the government do not coincide, voters can be expected to take
matters into their own hands and increase their voluntary labor supply in areas
presumably neglected by the state. Political consensus (coincidence of individual
and governmental ideological positions) may therefore crowd out voluntary labor
supply.
In the empirical political science literature, this political consensus with the ruling
power is predominantly operationalized by ‘conﬁdence in the government’: Brooks
and Lewis (2001) and Brooks (2004) measure the political consensus via ‘trust in
the government’ and examine whether low conﬁdence in the federal government
encourages or discourages contributions of time and money. Their ﬁndings point
to crowding out due to political consensus.
2.4 Participatory crowding in/out of time donations
Frey (1992, 1997) argues for crowding out based on a moral motivation: if a govern-
mental measure is perceived as controlling, we might expect crowding out; however,
when individuals feel acknowledged by the governmental contribution, crowding in
could also be expected. He postulates a change in preferences arising from an exter-
nal intervention. Benabou and Tirole (2000) model the inﬂuence of extrinsic factors
7on the crowding eﬀect via their impact as a signal on given preferences.6 From a
socio-political perspective, extensive political rights and a high degree of democra-
tization represent such motivating interventions that can crowd in private provision
of voluntary labor. Countries that guarantee high degrees of personal freedom and
political rights allow their citizens to actively participate in the political process and
to engage in volunteering organizations.
On the other hand, an increase in personal freedom might be accompanied by more
individualism (egoism) and lead to reduced solidarity among people. As a conse-
quence, volunteering may decrease if the government fosters the degree of democ-
ratization. In line with this argument, we refer again to the notion of crowding
out indicating that the governmental promotion of democratization has a detrimen-
tal eﬀect on volunteering behavior. Beyond that, several volunteering associations
advocate personal freedom and human rights. Their eﬀorts in this area represent
a substitute to governmental endeavors to promote personal liberties. This substi-
tutional relationship further strengthens the crowding out hypothesis of voluntary
activities by civil rights and the degree of democratization.
3 Data and estimation strategy
In order to test our hypotheses on crowding eﬀects, we combine data from diﬀerent
sources.7 Most importantly, we observe individual data for OECD member countries
from the European and World Values Survey (E/WVS). The E/WVS is an ongo-
ing academic project organized as a network of social scientists coordinated by a
central body, the World Values Survey Association. The survey provides data from
representative national samples (based on face-to-face interviews) of more than 80
countries. To date, four waves have been conducted: in 1981   1984, 1990   1993,
1995   1997, and 1999   2004. Each wave contains information on socio-economic
characteristics, basic attitudes, beliefs and human values covering religion, morality,
politics, work and leisure.
In particular, respondents were asked whether they do unpaid voluntary work for
any organization. We use a sample of almost 38;000 respondents from 24 OECD
member countries for the time span from 1981 to 2000 (see Table 2). In our sample,
approximately one third of the adult population does unpaid work for at least one
organization. Volunteers operate in diﬀerent types of organization. About 16% of
all volunteering activities (multiple voting possible) are provided for religious and
church organizations followed by associations for sports or recreation (14:2%) and
6For a survey on motivation crowding, see Frey and Jegen (2001).
7The Data appendix includes detailed information on all variable deﬁnitions and data sources.
8education, arts, music or cultural activities (10:7%). For a complete list of shares of
voluntary activities across organizations, see Figure 2.
We estimate a linear probability model8 for the volunteering decision of individual
i, in country c, and in year t,
volunteeringict =  + 1psect + 2pcict + 3dict +  Cct + Iict + c + t + "ict;
where the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent does unpaid voluntary
work for any organization, and zero otherwise. As variables of primary interest (to
be explained in detail below) we include public social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP (pse), a measure of political consensus (pc) and an index of democratization
(di). The set of country-level control variables Cct comprises three groups: tax
variables and public deﬁcits, other macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP
deﬂator, unemployment rate and the population size) and political variables (prime
minister’s political position). The set of individual-level controls Iict consists of
two groups: socio-economic variables (age, sex, family status, number of children,
education, labor market status, household income and size of hometown) and political
variables (individual’s political position).
In order to test our hypotheses on crowding eﬀects, controlling for unobserved
country- and time-invariant heterogeneity is indispensable.9 We therefore control for
country ﬁxed-eﬀects c and year ﬁxed-eﬀects t. If not all relevant control variables
are included, an estimation without country ﬁxed eﬀects would be less convincing,
since unobservable factors may be correlated with the variables of primary interest.
To identify complementary or substitutive relationships between government spend-
ing and voluntary labor supply, we would like to conﬁne public expenditure to ﬁelds
where volunteers provide their services. As a proxy for government provision of pub-
lic goods we use information on public social expenditure. In particular, we have
retrieved our data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Public social expen-
diture contains information on public spending along nine core social policy areas:
old age, survivors, incapacity-related beneﬁts, health, family, active labor market
policies (ALMP), unemployment, housing and other social policy areas. These data
are adequate for our analysis for the following reasons: (i) we observe a high corre-
spondence between components of public social expenditure and the voluntary ﬁelds
8Since the qualitative results of a logit estimation (discussed below) are equivalent, we will – for
ease of presentation – focus on the linear probability model throughout the paper. As pointed out
by Ai and Norton (2003); Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) the interpretation of nonlinear models is
quite cumbersome and not fully demonstrative.
9In principle, one would prefer to control for unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no cross-country individual-level panel data on
volunteering available.
9of action reported in the E/WVS, indicating that volunteers are predominantly active
in the social area (charitable services of religious organizations, social welfare activ-
ities for the elderly and disabled, youth work, local community action for poverty,
employment and housing ...). (ii) Moreover, the OECD Social Expenditure Database
provides widely accepted, internationally comparable statistics on social expenditure
at programme level. In contrast, the international comparability is not fully guaran-
teed for expenditure aggregates from the System of National Accounts which prove
inadequate for the analysis of public social policy, as pointed out by OECD (2007).
Column 2 in Table1 shows average aggregate public social expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP across countries. Public social expenditure is highest in Sweden,
Denmark, Belgium and France and is relatively low in Japan and Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. Table8 shows that old age, health, incapacity-related and family beneﬁts are
the quantitatively most important functional categories of aggregate public social
expenditure.10
Our measure of political consensus (pc) is equal to one if the respondent’s political
position corresponds with the prime minister’s political position and zero otherwise.
For a categorization of the parties we rely on the stated political positions in the
respective party’s entry in the free encyclopedia Wikipedia.11 This procedure results
in a list of twelve political positions for parties: far left, left, liberal left, green left,
center left, center, center right, green right, liberal right, right, far right, vote for
other party. Details are provided in the Data appendix. To construct a variable on
the respondent’s political position we use the following question from the E/WVS:
‘If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you
vote?’ We start with an aggregated classiﬁcation of political positions (with the values
left-wing, right-wing and other). That means that in our baseline speciﬁcation we
distinguish between respondents and prime ministers who are classiﬁed as either left-
wing, right-wing or other. Non-voters are included in the residual group. They have
by deﬁnition no political consensus with their prime minister. Column 3 in Table1
provides summary statistics of average political consensus across countries. It varies
from 0:26 in Hungary to 0:86 in Norway. In a next step we use the whole scale of
political positions to test the sensitivity of our results.
To diﬀerentiate between more and less democratic systems we use the Vanhanen
democratization index that measures the degree of democratization. This index
(see Vanhanen (2003)) is formed by multiplying a competition and a participation
variable. The political competition variable reﬂects the percentage of votes gained by
the smaller parties in national elections. The political participation variable indicates
10We will analyze the disaggregated social expenditure in Section 4.6.
11We presume that each party has a strong interest in ensuring that its entry in Wikipedia includes
correct information (on its political position) and therefore maintains its entry with great care.
10the percentage of the total population who actually vote in elections. Whereas
competition means that individuals are free to organize themselves and groups are
equally free to compete for power, participation in decision-making indicates the
relative number of people who take part in politics in general. The higher either
component, the higher is the degree of democratization.12 As can be seen in column
4 of Table1, Belgium (79:48), Italy (78:67), Norway (76:81) and Denmark (74:92)
show the highest democracy scores whereas the United States (33:33) is found at the
bottom of this list behind Poland (43:85), Hungary (47:23), and Canada (48:64).
Reversed causality
One might be concerned about potential endogeneity of the main variables of interest.
For instance, citizens may not adjust their volunteering behavior in response to public
government (social) spending, whereas the government could be expected to adapt
social spending according to citizens’ willingness to volunteer.
To show that our estimates are not biased by reversed causality we need exogenous
variation in public social spending. Therefore, we suggest an instrumental variable
approach based on the political budget cycle (PBC) according to which incumbent
politicians use ﬁscal policy measures in order to increase the likelihood of their re-
election.13 The identifying assumption is that the timing of the election has no
direct impact on the decision to volunteer. We argue that after excluding volunteers
of political parties and unions this is a reasonable assumption. Implementing our
identiﬁcation strategy we distinguish between observations with a ﬁrst order election
in the preceding, in the current, or in the subsequent year. The information on
elections is provided by Pippa Norris, Democracy Timeseries Dataset, 2009.
For consensual and participatory crowding in/out we are not concerned about en-
dogeneity, since after partialing out unobserved country- and time-variant hetero-
geneity reversed causality seems in both cases unlikely. It is implausible to assume
that individuals systematically reverse their political ideology once they change their
volunteering behavior. The formula of the Vanhanen democratization index does not
include the incidence of volunteering.
12Even though Vanhanen emphasizes that there is no natural index level for diﬀerentiating be-
tween democracies and non-democracies, he argues that a country must cross a threshold value for
competition of 30% and a value for participation of 10 20% if it is to be classiﬁed as a democracy.
13Assuming myopic voters political budget cycle models predict increasing government expendi-
ture before elections and budget consolidation thereafter. Surveys from Mueller (2003, chap. 19)
or Shi and Svensson (2003) provide empirical evidence for the validity of diﬀerent types of PBC
models.
114 Empirical results
This section presents our estimation results in the following way: ﬁrst, we discuss
the ﬁndings on the crowding hypotheses and provide results for diﬀerent groups of
controls (Table3 and 4). We ﬁnd empirical evidence for crowding out of volunteering
by governmental activities through three diﬀerent channels. In a second step, robust-
ness checks are presented (Tables5 and 6). Subsequently, we investigate the relation
between crowding eﬀects and income distribution (Table7). Finally, estimations of
crowding eﬀects by disaggregated public social expenditure data are discussed (Ta-
ble9).
4.1 Crowding eﬀects
Fiscal crowding in/out: Table3 shows that depending on the speciﬁcation, an in-
crease in public social expenditure by 1 percentage point of GDP decreases the
individual’s probability of volunteering by 1:7 up to 2:9 percentage points. As is
shown by the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the crowding out eﬀects tend to be higher if
more control variables are being used.
In order to make sure that the estimated eﬀect is causal, we present instrumental
variable estimations in Table 4.14 To capture the exogenous variation in public
social spending by the political budget cycle as precise as possible we distinguish
between observations with a ﬁrst order election in the ﬁrst and second half of the
preceding, of the current, and of the subsequent year with six binary variables. The
ﬁrst stage estimation is very strong: the F-statistic for the excluded instruments
is – depending on the speciﬁcation – at least 11:12. The signs of the statistically
signiﬁcant binary variables capturing the timing of the elections correspond mainly
with political budget cycle models assuming myopic voters: we observe an increase in
government social expenditure before elections and budget consolidation thereafter.
Most importantly, the second stage results conﬁrm our ﬁndings based on the linear
probability model. The estimated eﬀects of the instrumental variable estimation for
the full models are similar in size (compare columns (III)-(V) of Tables 3 and 4).
We therefore conclude that reversed causality is not a concern for ﬁscal crowding,
and single equation methods seem to be suﬃcient for unbiased estimates.
Consensual crowding in/out: Furthermore, we ﬁnd support for the crowding out hy-
pothesis due to political consensus. In column (II) of Table3 and 4 the estimation is
extended by individuals’ ideological positions (left-wing voter, right-wing voter, other
14These estimations exclude observations for volunteers of political parties (1;221) and unions
(892).
12voter). Column (III) adds in both tables the political orientation of the prime min-
ister (left prime minister).15 Based on these two variables, we estimate the eﬀect of
political consensus in columns (IV) and (V). Individuals whose ideological positions
coincide with the orientation of the prime minister decrease their volunteering eﬀorts.
A political consensus reduces the probability of volunteering by about 2 percentage
points. An individual can be expected to reduce her voluntary eﬀort as she believes
that those who are in political power behave in her spirit. Non-monetary govern-
ment action such as enacting laws and regulations, guaranteeing minority rights, or
promoting or limiting access to education and medical service leads those individuals
who are in line with the government to volunteer less.
As compared to the baseline group of non-voters, left-wing, right-wing and voters
of other parties have a higher propensity to volunteer. Obviously, voters indicate
a stronger social responsibility than non-voters. For right-wing voters (left-wing
voters, voters for other parties) the probabilities of volunteering based on the linear
probability model in Table 3 are 7:8 (6:3, 4:6) percentage points higher compared
to non-voters (column (II)).16 Although speciﬁcations (III) and (IV) show that the
probability of volunteering for countries with left-wing premiers is approximately
6 percentage points higher compared to countries with right-wing prime ministers,
this eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant if we include the Vanhanen democratization index
(column (V)).
Participatory crowding in/out: we use the Vanhanen index – a measure that in-
dicates a country’s degree of democratization – as a third variable to analyze the
relationship between government action and volunteering. It can be seen in column
(V) of Table3 and 4 that an increase in the degree of democratization by one in-
dex point decreases the probability of volunteering by about 1:0 percentage point.
Given the actual range of the Vanhanen index from 33 to 79, the estimated eﬀect
is quantitatively important. This result supports the hypothesis of crowding out:
the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the incentive for in-
dividuals to be involved in volunteering activities. We ran an analogical regression
using the Freedom House civil liberties ratings that cover freedom of expression and
belief, personal autonomy, associational and organizational rights, and rule of law
on a seven point scale.17 The results were very similar to those with the Vanhanen
index. An increase of civil liberties by one index point reduces the probability of
volunteering by 6:8 percentage points.
15We only observe right- and left-wing prime ministers.
16The issue of diﬀerent willingness to volunteer according to political orientation and religiosity
is addressed in detail below.
17More details on the Freedom House civil liberties ratings can be found in http://www.
freedomhouse.org.
13The striking result that public government activities inﬂuence private collective ac-
tion to a signiﬁcantly negative extent and crowd out volunteering is controlled for
by two groups of variables: country-level and individual-level characteristics.
4.2 Country-level controls
Public social expenditure can be paid for with tax revenues or by public debt. Hence,
we control for public revenues and government net lending in the estimations dis-
cussed above. In doing so, public revenues are measured by three variables expressed
as a percentage of gross domestic product: taxes on goods and services, taxes on in-
come and proﬁts, and the economically less relevant residual tax component, i.e.
miscellaneous taxes. With the exception of the residual tax variable, public revenues
exert a positive and – in most cases – statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on volun-
teering (see columns (I)-(V) in Table3 and 4). Apparently, the government aﬀects
opportunity costs of volunteering by imposing taxes on income and consumption. An
increase in taxes leads to a reduction in labor supply, fewer taxable leisure activities
and an increase in volunteering. The coeﬃcient of net government lending is negative
and predominantly signiﬁcant throughout our estimations and speciﬁcations. Alto-
gether it can be shown that the evidence of crowding out is preserved if we control
for taxes and public deﬁcits.
We also control for inﬂation (GDP deﬂator) and unemployment, both of which re-
duce the probability of volunteering. We conclude that volunteers need a certain
level of economic stability for their activities. This argument is supported by results
on the individual level where unemployed people show lower probabilities of volun-
teering (see below). The consumption model of volunteering hypothesizes that the
propensity to volunteer increases with income or wealth. Economic wealth, however,
is reported to strengthen individualism and can therefore be expected to reduce sol-
idarity among the population. In our regression both the per capita national income
(GDP p.c.) and the population size of a country remain mainly insigniﬁcant.18
4.3 Individual-level controls
The ﬁnal block of controls includes individual characteristics of respondents. Based
on our regressions, the typical volunteer is male, employed, well-educated and earns
a high income. Moreover, the probability of volunteering increases with the number
of children and with age at a decreasing rate. People living in big cities show a
lower probability of volunteering, whereas family status remain without signiﬁcant
inﬂuence.
18The coeﬃcient of individual income is, however, positive and highly signiﬁcant (see below).
14Finally, it should be noted that none of the year dummies is signiﬁcant in our speci-
ﬁcations. This is an indication that no long-run trend in voluntary activities exists.
Most of the country dummies are, however, statistically signiﬁcant.
4.4 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our results we estimate a logit model, control for religiosity
and use a more detailed measurement of political orientation.
Logit estimates – waves: a logit estimation is carried out based on the same speci-
ﬁcations as shown in Table3. As can be seen in Table 5, the qualitative results do
not change. Results remain unchanged as well if we use wave ﬁxed-eﬀects instead of
year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Introducing wave ﬁxed-eﬀects accounts for the fact that diﬀerent
waves of the E/WVS have been accomplished in diﬀerent years (results are available
upon request).
Religiosity: we also test robustness by including individual religiosity as another
control variable. Our measure for religiosity is based on the frequency of attending
religious services.19 As can be seen in Table6, crowding out eﬀects hardly change.
More religious people are more likely to volunteer. Depending on the chosen speci-
ﬁcation (see columns (I)-(V)), an increase in religiosity by one on the 8-point scale
increases the volunteering probability by 3:7 or 3:8 percentage points. Notably,
controlling for religiosity reduces the impact of the right-wing political orientation
substantially. The statistical diﬀerence between right-wing, left-wing and other vot-
ers disappears. Each group volunteers with a 5 percentage points higher probability
compared to non-voters (see column (V) in Table6). Hence it is not the politi-
cal/ideological orientation per se that is responsible for the high coeﬃcient of right-
wing respondents in Table3 but rather the correlation between being right-wing and
religious. Furthermore, we observe that including religiosity increases the negative
impact of being female from minus 2.9 percentage points in the baseline speciﬁcation
to minus 5 percentage points. Moreover, the negative inﬂuence of town size decreases
slightly since religiosity is higher in smaller domiciles. And ﬁnally, the coeﬃcient for
the number of children becomes insigniﬁcant in speciﬁcations (I) and (V).
Political attitudes: in the estimations presented above, political orientation has been
measured on a left-right-other scale. This approach is common since a classiﬁcation of
parties into left/right/other seems to be accepted without great opposition. However,
our data allow a more detailed measurement of political orientation on the dimensions
19The religiosity question in the questionnaire reads as ‘Apart from weddings, funerals and chris-
tenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?’ and the possible answers
range from ‘more than once a week’ to ‘never, practically never’.
15far left, left, liberal left, green left, center left, center, center right, green right, liberal
right, right, far right, and vote for other party. This more detailed scale – both for the
political orientation of respondents and the political aﬃliation of the prime minister
– makes a more diﬀerentiated rating of the political consensus variable possible.
Due to the higher measurement accuracy of the political consensus, we expect an
ever stronger crowding out eﬀect of this variable on volunteering. Accordingly, if we
switch from the 3-point scale to the full scale of party classiﬁcation we ﬁnd that the
eﬀect of political consensus on the probability of volunteering changes from  1:8 (see
columns (IV) and (V) in Table 3) to  2:8 percentage points. Results are available
upon request.
One might argue that the political consensus need not necessarily be based on the
conformity between individual political orientation and the party of the prime min-
ister. To check robustness with another concept, the consensus variable is set to one
if an individual’s preferred party is in power. Based on this deﬁnition of political
consensus, we reconﬁrm the crowding out hypothesis with statistically signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcients for political consensus (compare with columns (IV) and (V) in
Table3) of  1:8 and  1:6 percentage points. Results are available upon request.
Similar to Brooks and Lewis (2001) and Brooks (2004), who ﬁnd that trust in the
federal government discourages volunteering, we include the variable ‘conﬁdence in
the parliament’ from the E/WVS dataset for another sensitivity analysis. Following
the crowding out argumentation, we again expect a negative inﬂuence of trust on the
propensity to volunteer. Our regression results conﬁrm this expectation. The higher
the conﬁdence in the parliament the lower is the probability to volunteer. The coef-
ﬁcients of all other variables (including the political consensus) remain unchanged.20
We interpret this as further evidence of consensual crowding out.
4.5 Crowding eﬀects and income distribution
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) argue that in a world of balanced public bud-
gets, an increase in the governmental provision of a public good is equivalent to a
redistribution of income and demonstrate that equalizing wealth redistribution will
either leave constant or reduce voluntary contributions to the public good. Apart
from the material coverage of an individual’s livelihood in absolute terms, one may
argue that the distribution of economic well-being is another important determinant
of volunteering and that the vertical distribution of income among diﬀerent social
groups therefore inﬂuences the provided level of volunteering. Since we expect that
income redistribution reduces voluntary labor supply, we include inequality mea-
sures as robustness checks in our estimations. If individuals are expected to invest
20Results are available upon request.
16resources to catch up with incomes of others, a more equal income distribution in
a country may reduce the incentive to foster one’s individual income or wealth. A
higher level (probability) of volunteering may follow as a result.
Gini coeﬃcients are natural candidates for empirical implementation of distributional
aspects. Our preference is to observe before-tax Ginis and after-tax Ginis. The
before-tax Ginis are considered as a measure of the structural (in)equality which can
only be inﬂuenced indirectly by the state. The diﬀerence between the before-tax and
the after-tax Gini coeﬃcients can be directly attributed to governmental redistribu-
tion through current tax policy. Using only after-tax Ginis, one has to accept that
structural redistribution cannot be disentangled from redistribution induced by tax
policy. Whereas the availability of before-tax Ginis is limited, two data sources of
after-tax Ginis exist: Gini coeﬃcients provided by the OECD and the coeﬃcients
published in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Ginis published by the OECD
would, however, reduce our sample size substantially since only a few country-years
are available in this database. We therefore employ the LIS after-tax Gini coeﬃcients
measured between 0 and 100.21
Table 7 presents estimations including the LIS Gini coeﬃcients. Given that taxes,
public social expenditure and net government lending inﬂuence the after-tax in-
come distribution22, we include only the variable for the Gini measure in a ﬁrst
step (columns (I) to (III)). In line with Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) we
ﬁnd that higher income inequality results in a higher propensity to volunteer. An
increase of the Gini coeﬃcient by 1 increases the probability of volunteering by 1
to 1.5 percentage points. We interpret this result as another form of crowding out
of volunteering by a more equal income distribution. Compared to previous results,
the coeﬃcients for political consensus and for the Vanhanen democratization index
remain unchanged. Columns (IV) to (VI) include both the Gini coeﬃcients and the
full list of ﬁscal policy variables. The estimations again conﬁrm the robustness of our
results: both the impact of the Gini coeﬃcients and the impact of the other variables
of interest do not change. Public social expenditure, the political consensus, and the
Vanhanen democratization index keep their negative and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
propensity to volunteer.
21It should be noted that the quality of the available Gini coeﬃcients is criticized in the literature
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
22Correlation coeﬃcients between the Gini coeﬃcient and taxes on goods and services, taxes on
income and proﬁts, public social expenditure and net government lending are -0.54, -0.31, -0.64,
and -0.02 respectively.
174.6 Disaggregated public social expenditure
In order to see a more detailed picture of the impacts of public social expenditure on
volunteering, we present ﬁnal regression results with disaggregated social expendi-
ture.23 As can be seen in Table9, in the majority of the categories we ﬁnd evidence
of the crowding out with the strongest eﬀects for active labor market policy, followed
by expenditure for incapacity-related beneﬁts, unemployment, housing and old age.
Two groups of public social expenditure, however, indicate crowding in of collective
voluntary action. An increase of public expenditure for families and other social
policy areas increases the probability of volunteering.
The complementary relationship between ‘family social expenditure’ and the prob-
ability of volunteering indicates that individuals are willing to volunteer as soon as
the ﬁnancial protection of their families is being guaranteed. In other words, peo-
ple are given the opportunity to volunteer through governmental family support. It
follows that the promotion of volunteer activities would require government coﬁnanc-
ing through family support measures such as expenditure for child care, maternity,
parental leave, parental allowance, etc.
5 Conclusions
This paper explores institutional and political factors shaping the citizen’s motiva-
tion to work for free. Focusing on the role of the state we ﬁnd empirical evidence
for crowding out of voluntary labor provision on three dimensions. (i) Fiscal crowd-
ing out: an increase in public social expenditure by 1 percentage point of GDP
decreases the individual’s probability of volunteering by about 2 percentage points.
(ii) Consensual crowding out: a political consensus between the voter and the prime
minister reduces the probability of volunteering by 1:8 percentage points. A dis-
tinct government ideological orientation leads those individuals who are sympathetic
to the government to volunteer less. (iii) Participatory crowding out: the more a
government supports democratization, the lower is the incentive to volunteer. An
increase of Vanhanen’s degree of democratization by one index point decreases the
probability of volunteering by 1 percentage point. Similarly, redistribution policies
also have negative consequences on the probability of working for free.
For the ﬁrst time, this paper documents that – apart from individual-level impacts
– non-monetary and monetary government activities determine the provision of vol-
untary labor. What is the social policy implication of these results? Social policy
23For descriptive statistics of public social expenditure components, see Table8.
18measures and the promotion of democratization are beneﬁcial to society per se. How-
ever, negative impacts on volunteering behavior need to be taken into account.
Another striking result of this analysis is the necessity of economic stability as a pre-
requisite for volunteering engagement. This can be seen both on the micro and the
macro level. Lower rates of inﬂation and unemployment in a country as well as income
and employment on the individual level contribute to higher volunteering probabil-
ities. As a consequence, a government can make a contribution to the provision of
volunteering activities through macroeconomic stabilization policy. Disaggregated
public social expenditure categories indicate a complementary relationship of single
components with volunteering. Governmental family support measures promote vol-
unteering activities. This result is another argument in support of the importance
of personal economic stability for volunteering.
On the individual political level, we ﬁnd a higher probability of volunteering for
politically motivated people (voters) as compared to non-voters. Right-wing people
as compared to their left-wing counterparts show a higher propensity to volunteer.
These diﬀerences disappear, however, if we control for religiosity.
Finally, our results seem to be relevant for the debate on the measurement of so-
cial capital. Generally, the measurement of social capital includes four dimensions:
(i) interpersonal trust, (ii) institutional trust (e.g. conﬁdence in parliament), (iii)
participation in civil society (e.g. volunteering), (iv) trustworthiness of the respon-
dents themselves. Our results show that increasing conﬁdence in parliament reduces
participation in volunteering. The trade-oﬀ between increasing institutional trust
and participation in civil society complicates the concept of social capital formation
considerably and requires a more thorough analysis of the interrelation among the
four components.
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226 Data appendix
6.1 Variables of primary interest
The dependent variable volunteering is equal to one if the respondent does unpaid
voluntary work and zero otherwise. The data are from the European and World Val-
ues Survey (E/WVS). In particular, we use the European and World Values Survey
Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004. We include all observations of respon-
dents from OECD member countries for which information on volunteering and all
individual-level control variables is available (see below).
As a proxy for government provision of public goods we use data on public social
expenditure measured as a percentage of GDP from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database. An expenditure item is classiﬁed as social if the beneﬁts are intended
to address one or more social purposes, and if programmes regulating the provision
involve either inter-personal redistribution, or compulsory participation. The OECD
groups beneﬁts with a social purpose into nine policy areas: (i) old age (pensions,
early retirement pensions, home-help and residential services for the elderly), (ii)
survivors (pensions and funeral payments), (iii) incapacity-related beneﬁts (care ser-
vices, disability beneﬁts, beneﬁts accruing from occupational injury and accident leg-
islation, employee sickness payments), (iv) health (spending on in- and out-patient
care, medical goods, prevention), (v) family (child allowances and credits, child-
care support, income support during leave, sole parent payments), (vi) active labor
market policies (employment services, training, youth measures, subsidized employ-
ment, employment measures for the disabled), (vii) unemployment (unemployment
compensation, severance payment, early retirement for labor market reasons), (viii)
housing (housing allowances and rent subsidies), and (ix) other social policy areas
(non-categorical cash beneﬁts to low-income households, other social services). For
further details, refer to OECD (2007).
The variable political consensus is equal to one if the respondent’s political position
corresponds with the prime minister’s political position and is zero otherwise. The
deﬁnitions and sources of the respondents’ and the prime ministers’ political positions
are provided below.
The Vanhanen democratization index measures the degree of democratization
in diﬀerent countries. Data on this index – developed by Tatu Vanhanen (Van-
hanen (2003)) – are available from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (http:
//www.fsd.uta.fi). The degree of democratization is formed by multiplying a com-
petition and a participation variable. The political competition variable reﬂects the
percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in national elections. It is calcu-
lated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the party with most votes from
100. The political participation variable indicates the voting turnout in each elec-
tion and is calculated as the percentage of the total population who actually vote in
elections. The higher either component, the higher is the degree of democratization.
In our data sample, the degree of democratization varies between 79.48 (Belgium)
and 33.33 (United States). For further details, refer to Vanhanen (undated).
236.2 Country-level control variables
The tax control variables comprise a set of variables capturing tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP and government net lending. Data on tax revenues as a percent-
age of GDP are from the OECD Factbook 2007. This distinguishes between taxes
on goods and services and taxes on income and proﬁts. Taxes on goods and services
cover all taxes levied on the production, extraction, sale, transfer, leasing or deliv-
ery of goods, and the rendering of services, or on the use of goods or permission to
use goods or to perform activities. They consist mainly of value added and sales
taxes. Taxes on incomes and proﬁts cover taxes levied on the net income or proﬁts
(gross income minus allowable tax reliefs) of individuals and enterprises. They also
cover taxes levied on the capital gains of individuals and enterprises, and gains from
gambling. Since the sum of taxes on goods and services and taxes on income and
proﬁts do not equal total tax revenues, we base taxes on residual categories that
also include payments by employers and employees made under compulsory social
security schemes as well as payroll taxes, taxes related to the ownership and transfer
of property, and other taxes. For further details, refer to the OECD Factbook 2007.
The data on government net lending are from the OECD Factbook 2007 according
to the 1993 System of National Accounts. It is equal to the diﬀerence between total
revenue and total expenditure, including capital expenditure (in particular, gross
ﬁxed capital formation). A negative ﬁgure indicates a deﬁcit.
The primary source of the other macroeconomic control variables (GDP per
capita, GDP deﬂator, unemployment rate and population size) is the OECD Factbook
2007. Some missing values have been supplemented with data from various issues
of the OECD Economic Outlook. Gini coeﬃcients are taken from the Luxembourg
Income Study (http://www.lisproject.org).
The country-level political control variables capture the political position of
the prime minister’s party. The information is collected from the free encyclope-
dia Wikipedia. In order to categorize the parties we rely on the political positions
of parties as presented in Wikipedia, see e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Democratic_Party_(United_States). We presume that each party has a strong
interest in ensuring that its entry in Wikipedia provides correct information (on its
political position) and therefore maintains its entry with great care. This procedure
results in the following categorization of political positions for parties: far left, left,
liberal left, green left, center left, center, center right, green right, liberal right, right,
far right and other. In a simpliﬁed version we use an aggregated classiﬁcation of po-
litical positions with the values left-wing (comprising far left, left, liberal left, green
left and center left), right-wing (comprising center, center right, green right, liberal
right, right and far right) and other. The prime ministers are accordingly classiﬁed
as left-wing prime minister, right-wing prime minister and other prime minister.
Information on dates of elections in diﬀerent countries is provided by Pippa Norris,
Democracy Timeseries Dataset, 2009.
246.3 Individual-level control variables
The information on socio-economic control variables such as age, sex, mari-
tal status (married or not), number of children, household income (measured on a
ten-point scale), education, size of hometown (measured on a three-point scale), em-
ployment status (employed, self-employed, unemployed and out of the labor force)
and religiosity is from the E/WVS. The E/WVS includes two questions on educa-
tion: (i) ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ and (ii)
‘At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education?’While the
former question would be preferable to measure the level of education, it involves
considerably more missing answers compared to the latter one. In order to exploit
all the available information on education and to retain as much data as possible,
we construct a variable capturing the actual or the regular school-leaving age. In
particular, if information on the second question is available we use it. In the cases
where the answer to the second question was missing but information on the ﬁrst
question was available, we have imputed the regular school-leaving age of the respec-
tive educational level. We distinguish two cases: (i) If there is information on both
questions for other respondents from the same country and year available, we impute
the average school-leaving age among those with the same highest educational level
attained. (ii) If there were no respondents from the same country and year available
with information on both questions, we imputed the regular school-living age of the
respective educational level. The E/WVS question on religiosity reads as follows:
‘Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend re-
ligious services these days?’ The possible answers are: ‘More than once a week’(8),
‘Once a week’(7), ‘Once a month’(6), ‘Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter
days’(5), ‘Other speciﬁc holy days’(4), ‘Once a year’(3), ‘Less often’(2), ‘Never,
practically never’(1). In the E/WVS dataset our trust variable is captured by the
question ‘Could you tell me how much conﬁdence you have in the parliament?’. The
following answers were oﬀered: ‘None at all’ (1), ‘Not very much conﬁdence’ (2),
‘Quite a lot of conﬁdence’ (3), and ‘A great deal of conﬁdence’ (4).
The individual-level political control variables are based on the E/WVS and
Wikipedia. To construct a variable on the respondents’ political position (e.g. left-
wing voter, right-wing voter and other voter) we use the following question from the
E/WVS: ‘If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list
would you vote?’In order to categorize the parties on this list we rely on the political
positions of the parties as provided in Wikipedia (for details, see the information on
the deﬁnition of the variable for the prime minister).
257 Table appendix
Table 1: Mean of variables of primary interesta
Participation rate Public social expend. Political Vanhanen
in volunteering




Austria 0.29 24.63 0.50 68.37
Belgium 0.37 25.33 0.56 79.48
Canada 0.48 17.40 0.50 48.64
Czech Republic 0.34 20.01 0.35 72.95
Denmark 0.34 26.13 0.42 74.92
Finland 0.42 21.32 0.41 66.14
France 0.27 25.29 0.57 59.11
Germany 0.28 24.42 0.42 63.57
Great Britain 0.32 18.06 0.48 58.35
Greece 0.43 21.38 0.42 70.36
Hungary 0.16 21.64 0.26 47.23
Iceland 0.34 15.45 0.45 67.13
Ireland 0.29 15.52 0.74 51.90
Italy 0.26 20.85 0.31 78.67
Japan 0.16 13.68 0.42 49.29
Luxembourg 0.32 21.74 0.28 54.07
Netherlands 0.44 22.13 0.57 71.68
Norway 0.38 22.61 0.86 76.81
Poland 0.14 22.23 0.32 43.85
Portugal 0.19 13.67 0.41 52.23
Slovak Republic 0.54 18.76 0.60 62.91
Spain 0.16 20.23 0.46 63.54
Sweden 0.56 30.06 0.70 70.03
United States 0.50 13.97 0.53 33.33
0.33 20.69 0.48 61.86
a These ﬁgures give the values for the years listed in Table2. In cases where more than one year per country
is available, we have calculated an average for these years. b Share of the adult population that does unpaid
voluntary work. Source: E/WVS. c Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database. For details, refer to the
Data appendix. d Share of adult population that would vote for the current prime minister’s party in a
hypothetical national election at the time of the survey. Source: E/WVS. e Vanhanen’s democratization
index is calculated by multiplying the percentage of votes gained by all parties but the one with most votes
and the percentage of the total population who actually vote in elections. Source: Finnish Social Science
Data Archive.
26Table 2: Number of available observations per country and year
1981 1982 1990 1999 2000
Austria 0 0 1,014 942 0 1,956
Belgium 100
a 0 1,203 1,127 0 2,430
Canada 0 156 1,088 0 1,323 2,567
Czech Republic 0 0 0 1,421 0 1,421
Denmark 0 0 746 749 0 1,495
Finland 0 0 0 0 712 712
France 156 0 578 1,000 0 1,734
Germany 0 0 2,775 1,301 0 4,076
Great Britain 122 0 936 551 0 1,609
Greece 0 0 0 705 0 705
Hungary 0 0 0 748 0 748
Iceland 0 0 0 720 0 720
Ireland 60
a 0 767 670 0 1,497
Italy 198
a 0 932 1,055 0 2,185
Japan 0 0 612 0 966 1,578
Luxembourg 0 0 0 459 0 459
Netherlands 0 0 666 832 0 1,498
Norway 0 0 829 0 0 829
Poland 0 0 0 892 0 892
Portugal 0 0 832 0 0 832
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 1,059 0 1,059
Spain 0 0 1,410 547 706 2,663
Sweden 0 0 0 532 0 532
United States 0 1,309 1,409 1,044 0 3,762
636 1,465 15,797 16,354 3,707 37,959
a Observations for Belgium 1981, Ireland 1981 and Italy 1981 cannot be used for
the disaggregated analysis presented in Table9 since the OECD Social Expen-
diture Database does not include ﬁgures for public social expenditure for active



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Peace movement
Third world development or human rights
Conservation, environmental, animal rights groups
Women's groups
Local community action (e.g. poverty, employment, housing)
Labor unions
Professional associations
Political parties or groups
Voluntary organisations concerned with health
Other social groups
Youth work (scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.)
Social welfare services (e.g. for elderly or handicapped people)
Education, arts, music or cultural activities
Sports or recreation
Religious or church organisations
Share of voluntary activities
36